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ABSTRACT
Innovation in the U.S. economy is about employing and rewarding highly talented workers to
produce new products.  Using unique longitudinal matched employer-employee data, this paper
makes a key connection between talent and firms in markets with risky product innovations.  We
show that software firms that operate in product markets with highly skewed returns to innovation,
or high variance payoffs, are more likely to attract and pay for star workers.  Thus, firms in high
variance product markets pay more up-front—in starting salaries—to attract and motivate star
employees, because if these star workers produce home-run innovations, the firm’s winnings will
be huge.  However, we also find these same firms pay highly for loyalty:  star workers that stay with
a firm have much higher earnings in firms with high variance product market payoffs.  The large
effects on earnings are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of controls for both workers and firm
characteristics.  One key control is that we also show that in firms that have actually hit home runs,
with high revenues, the rewards for star talent are even greater.  We also find that the dispersion of
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1.  Introduction 
Innovation occurs because firms employ and reward highly talented workers to produce 
new products.  Yet innovation is inherently risky – particularly in the production of information 
goods and services. This paper makes a key connection between the riskiness of the product 
markets in which firms operate and the distribution of earnings for workers. It also finds that 
firms in high risk markets pay highly for loyalty: employees that stay with a firm have much 
higher earnings in firms with high variance product market payoffs. 
The basic insight of our approach is that we recognize that cost of developing a new 
information product is very high in both time and worker skill. If the new product is widely 
adopted, the payoff to the firm can be enormous, but if the new product languishes with little use, 
the  loss  can  be  commensurately  large.  Software  products  are  the  poster  child  for  this 
phenomenon.  Video games are at or near the top of the list for high stakes product development: 
the latest release of Grand Theft Auto (Vice City) has had more than $200 million in revenues, 
while many games make much less.  By contrast, in the same industry, business applications 
software  (e.g.,  database  software)  is  much  less  risky:  once  applications  have  been  adopted, 
software producers have an installed client base that provides a degree of stability for future 
product development. Our approach examines how these very different potential payoffs in the 
product market translate into how firms hire and retain “star” software developers.    
Our  focus  is  to  investigate  the  link  between  the  differential  payoff  distribution  for 
different types of products and the earnings distribution of workers in the software industry.  We 
examine how firms in a product line where “home run” products matter, attract, motivate, and 
retain star employees. We do this using a rich new longitudinal matched employer-employee 
data source that permits tracking of outcomes for both firms and workers in the software industry 
over time. On the firm side, we have rich information about the detailed product mix and revenue 
outcomes for each firm so that we can measure both its actual payoff and its potential payoff 
distribution based upon its product mix. On the worker side, we measure both earnings levels 
(including the contribution of exercised stock options and bonuses) and earnings growth due to 
both within firm pay increases and job-hopping between firms. We use this rich data source to 
investigate the connection between the payoff to high stakes products and the rewards to stars in 
the software industry.      3 
The theoretical motivation for the empirical analysis begins with the assumption that all 
innovative firms want workers who are good at designing or picking new projects.  The key 
insight of the model is that some firms value this talent much more than other firms do (Lazear 
2005).  If the firm is operating in a product market in which innovation is rarely rewarded, or in 
which even a great project has little return, then the payoff distribution is low variance and the 
value of talent is low.  On the other hand, if the firm is operating in a product market in which 
the payoff distribution has a high variance, as it does in the video game example above, then the 
firm values talent highly because talented workers who pick projects well can win the most in 
markets where there are huge potential payoffs.  The prediction is that those firms operating in 
high variance payoff markets will hire more talent, and that they will therefore pay higher wages.   
Our  unique  microeconomic  data  enable  us  to  look  inside  firms  and  observe  what 
innovative high potential payoff firms do to attract and reward star talent.  First, we show that the 
high potential payoff firms pay more in starting salaries than other firms.  These firms select star 
software workers who themselves have a history of prior success (i.e., selecting workers who 
have a personal history of high wage levels and high wage growth rates).  Second, we show that 
high potential payoff firms reward workers for loyalty; that is, they reward workers for staying 
with the firm. Our findings show that star software workers, who achieve the highest pay levels, 
do  so  through  loyalty  –  these  workers  stay  with  their  firm  and  receive  higher  levels  of 
performance pay.  There is also an institutional side that produces this loyalty – firms in the 
software industry tie workers with deferred pay in the form of stock options that fully vest after 
four years. 
It has been rare for researchers to have data that link the product market strategy of the 
firm to the compensation or human resource management practices of the firm.  This has been 
done largely in the literature on CEO pay, where data are available, and the literature documents 
CEO pay-for-performance as a function of firm size or underlying strategies.  There have been 
isolated instances in which researchers have done “insider” studies in some firms in which they 
have documented a link between strategy and performance (Baker and Hubbard 2003; Stern 
2004;  Wulf  2002,  2005;  Garicano  and  Hubbard  2005),  or  have  used  survey  data  to  do  so 
(MacLeod and Parent 1999).  There has also been some research on workers in the information 
industry, as it has become an increasingly dominant part of the U.S. economy (Chevalier and 
Ellison 1999, Garicano and Hubbard 2005, Fallick et al. 2005, Lerner and Wulf 2005). Typically,   4 
however, there has been a major gap between the theoretical models and the empirical models of 
incentive contracts and sorting. That is, each theoretical model of some form of incentive pay 
states  the  assumptions  under  which  that  form  of  pay  is  optimally  adopted,  but  empirical 
researchers  may,  at  best,  show  that  some  firms  succeed  with  incentive  pay,  but  do  not 
empirically model its adoption.  We show that incentive pay plans and sorting aimed at high 
talent are optimal when the firm’s strategy is to operate in high potential payoff product markets.   
In short, our analysis reveals that firms that operate in innovative high payoff product 
markets  will  select  star  workers  and  will  pay  stars  both  higher  starting  salaries  and  higher 
performance pay.  These innovating firms put substantial sums of money up front in the form of 
salaries for talent because they are betting on a high stakes game of producing winning high-
payoff products.  Of course, these high-stakes firms control the probabilistic outcomes: they pay 
for performance by sorting workers, or by paying high wages to attract the best talent so the 
probability of winning is higher for them.  They also pay for stars with performance pay with 
experience and with requirements of loyalty, which increases the probability that they will win 
the game.  As a result, the firms playing in the high-stakes market for innovations cause earnings 
inequality to rise. When one of their projects hits it big, customers around the world buy that 
project and it is enormously profitable. That makes the talent at innovative firms enormously 
valuable, and hence not only increases the variance of pay dramatically for starting salaries but 
also increases pay ex post for experienced workers for winning the innovation competition.  The 
highest skilled stars are much more highly valued and paid than those who are slightly less 
skilled.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we provide some background basic 
facts about the software industry that help motivate our approach and analysis. Our application 
of  the  Lazear  (2005)  model  is  sketched  in  Section  3.  A  detailed  description  of  the  data  is 
provided  in  section  4.  The  empirical  specifications  we  explore  and  the  results  from  these 
specifications are presented in Sections 4 and 5. Concluding remarks are provided in section 6. 
2.  Background Facts 
We present some basic facts in this section that help motivate the approach and analysis 
that follows.  These facts are aimed at describing the revenue payoff distribution for firms and 
the wage distribution for workers in the software industry.     5 
First, software firms on average pay relatively high salaries, but a small subset of workers 
in the industry receive  particularly high wages.  The top half of Table 1 provides summary 
statistics about the distribution of income from the 2000 Decennial Census Public-Use Microdata 
Sample  (PUMS)  for  workers  in  all  industries  and  in  the  software  industry.
1  Workers  in  the 
software industry as a whole earn more than twice what workers in all other industries earn 
(looking at either the mean or median).   
The PUMS data suggest that, while the variance of pay in software is relatively large, 
compensation is not appreciably more skewed to the right for workers in software than in other 
industries.  However,  these  data  do  not  measure  earnings  that  are  important  in  software  – 
performance bonuses and stock options.  Thus, in the bottom half of Table 1, we use data for 
workers in the software industry from employer-filed Unemployment Insurance (UI) records, 
which contain data on all earnings including bonuses and stock options.
2  Because these UI data 
do not contain hours of work or occupation information, we limit our sample to workers earning 
at least $50,000 in the software industry.
3   Moreover, we focus on job spells in the software 
industry that are ongoing in 1997 since this sample of spells is useful for our later analysis 
exploiting firm level characteristics.   Four different measures of earnings related to this spell are 
reported.  The  earnings  at  the  start  of  the  job  spell,  the  earnings  for  experienced  workers 
measured as the earnings at the end of the observed spell in the software industry, the earnings of 
workers one year prior to the end of the observed spell in the software industry and the earnings 
in the last quarter of the prior spell (conditional of course on the prior spell being observed).  
There  are  left  and  right  censoring  issues  that  we  deal  with  in  the  standard  ways  in  our 
econometric  analysis  below,  but  even  with  these  limitations  there  are  interesting  patterns 
observed in the lower panel of Table 1.  The earnings levels for end of spell are much higher than 
                                                 
1 We focus on full-time workers between 21 and 44 years of age. 
2 These data are from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Program and are described in detail 
in our data section below.  
3 The $50,000 cutoff is discussed in more detail below, but note that based on Decennial Census PUMS data, two-
thirds  of  all  software  workers  and  four-fifths  of  software  engineers  (Census  occupation  code  102)  have  total 
earnings of at least $50,000.  When we replicate the mean of total earnings in Table 1 using only those software 
engineers, it is little changed, rising from $90,668 in the table to $103,881.  Note finally that the $50,000 is the 
worker’s earnings when we last observed him or her in the data – 36 percent of those earning $50,000 or more when 
we last observe them have starting salaries less than $50,000.  Fortunately, Table 1 (as well our robustness analysis 
discussed in more detail below) shows that by using a relatively simple income cutoff, we can identify the software 
developers and  managers in  the administrative data.  That is, focusing on  workers earning  more than $50,000 
annually in constant 2001 dollars yields workers that are well identified as software developers and managers.   
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beginning of spell and are very skewed to the right.  The skewness is especially pronounced for 
the most highly paid workers (the top decile in terms of end-of-spell earnings).  The median for 
the top decile is $670K and the 90
th percentile $6.7 million at end of spell with a median of $81K 
and a 90
th percentile of $174K at the beginning of spell.  Clearly, this top group has enormous 
average within spell wage growth at both the median and especially at the 90
th percentile.  Much 
of this high end-of-spell earnings could be bonuses and/or exercised options upon leaving the 
firm (since it is end-of-spell), so examining the patterns one year prior to the end of spell is also 
of interest. 
 
Table 1: Summary Information about the Earnings Distribution  
   Mean  Median  90th  SD 
2000 Decennial Census - Workers 21-44, 35+ Hours/Week & 35+ Weeks/Year 
All Industries 
    Total Earnings  40,918  31,891  70,160  183,134 
    Wage and Salary Income  38,685  31,466  69,097  173,449 
Software Publishing Industry (NAICS 5112) 
    Total Earnings  80,787  63,782  127,563  334,906 
    Wage and Salary Income  80,006  63,782  127,563  333,669 
Computer Software Engineers (102) in the Software Publishing Industry (NAICS 5112) 
    Total Earnings  90,668  70,691  138,193  369,374 
    Wage and Salary Income  90,496  70,160  138,193  369,777 
   Mean  Median*  90th*  SD 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) Data - Workers 21-44, Earning $50,000+ Annualized  
Software Publishing Industry (NAICS 5112) 
    Starting Annualized Earnings (Excludes Left-Censored)  69,353  59,665  108,692  82,432 
    Ending Spell Annualized Earnings (Censored and Uncensored)  344,268  95,508  310,644  2,051,985 
    One-Year Prior Annualized Earnings (Censored and Uncensored)**  199,172  86,796  220,760  1,101,658 
    Prior-Spell End-of-Spell Annualized Earnings***  60,951  51,532  100,987  133,153 
Top Decile of Workers (by Last Observed Earnings) in Software Publishing Industry (NAICS 5112) 
    Starting Annualized Earnings (Excludes Left-Censored)  107,660  80,899  184,951  142,526 
    Ending Spell Annualized Earnings (Censored and Uncensored)  2,532,500  670,993  6,688,470  6,064,204 
    One-Year Prior Annualized Earnings (Censored and Uncensored)**  750,551  171,642  1,338,380  2,862,843 
    Prior-Spell End-of-Spell Annualized Earnings***  98,467  73,434  164,194  150,428 
* Average within a 10% band around the true percentile. ** Annualized earnings three quarters prior to last observed full quarter.  
*** Includes only individuals for whom we observe a prior spell in the data. 
 
Second, the pay of software workers rises markedly with tenure.  Figure 1 compares the 
earnings  distribution  for  starting-workers  salaries  to  the  distribution  for  experienced-workers 
earnings (based on the UI data containing options, and exact values are given in the bottom half 
of  Table  1).  While  70%  of  starting  earnings  are  below  $75,000,  only  29%  of  experienced 
workers  earn  below  $75,000  (experienced  workers  have  an  average  tenure  of  five  years).  
Similarly, only 4% of starting salaries are above $150,000, but 21% of experienced workers earn   7 
above  that  amount.  Since  starting  salaries  include  the  salaries  paid  to  new  but  experienced 





Third, there appears to be a high variance to the gains to innovation in the software 
industry.  We present the distribution of revenues for the top ten video games in Table 2.  The 
distribution is highly skewed; even restricting attention to the top ten games of 2002, the top 
game earned nearly five times as much as the bottom.  We have selected video games as an 
illustrative example; as mentioned in the introduction, not all software firms have such a skewed 
payoff  distribution  for  their  products.  In  the  consumer  video  game  market,  the  costs  of 
consumers  switching  to  a  new  “hot”  game  is  minimal  and  hence  firms  in  this  market  have 
enormous potential gains if the product does ‘hit’ in the market. However, the same is not true 
for firms that produce enterprise resource software for large mainframe computers; these firms 
have  a  lower  variance  payoff.  Since  large  firms  have  locked  into  a  software  provider  and 
purchase it year after year, the provider is profitable, but software product innovations do not 
have enormous upside  potential gains.   A  good example of this is the SAS  Institute, which 
produces statistical software for businesses.  SAS sells its software through licenses to firms, and 
have about a 97% renewal rate (Stanford GSB Case 1997).     
                                                 
4 By experienced earnings, we are referring to end of spell earnings (see data appendix for details).  On average, the 
experienced earners have more than five years of tenure.  For now, we include both censored and uncensored spells 
for experienced earnings but exclude left-censored spells for starting earnings. In subsequent sections, we control for 
censoring in all of the empirical specifications relating earnings outcomes.   8 
 
Table 2: Top Video Games, Ranked by 2002 Sales Revenues 
Game  Firm  2002 Revenues (Millions) 
Grand Theft Auto Vice City  Take 2  $218 
Grand Theft Auto 3  Take 2  $120 
Madden NFL 2003  Electronic Arts  $119 
Medal of Honor  Electronic Arts  $73 
Kingdom Hearts  Square Enix  $59 
Spider Man  Activision  $54 
Halo  Microsoft  $51 
SOCOM Seals  Sony  $50 
Super Mario Sunshine  Nintendo  $49 
Tony Hawks  Activision  $46 
 
Source: Merrill Lynch, “Reinstating Coverage of Video Game Industry,” In-depth Report.  January 21, 2004. 
 
In  what  follows,  we  provide  a  model  that  links  the  skewness  of  firms’  payoff 
distributions to the skewness and high pay of software workers.  Although our empirical analysis 
encompasses firms from different software product lines, we use the video game product line to 
illustrate some prima facie evidence.   
3.  Model of Innovation 
We model the process of producing innovative software products, though this process 
may  well  apply  to  innovations  undertaken  by  most  knowledge  workers.  The  fundamental 
characteristic  of  software  production  is  uncertainty  —  not  knowing  whether  an  innovative 
product will pay off.
5 In software innovation, two groups of employees must select projects: 
software developers must begin working on a new software project not knowing whether they 
will develop a great product, and software managers must allocate funds to research projects not 
knowing whether the product will succeed in the market.  Thus, a model of project selection 
pertains to the work of managers and software programmers (or developers). 
Given  the  uncertainty  about  whether  projects  will  be  successful,  the  key  role  of  an 
employee seeking to make innovations is to create or pick the best projects. The model by Lazear 
(2005) demonstrates how employees who are the best at creating or picking projects should be 
sorted among firms operating in high variance payoff markets.
6  Assume that projects can have 
                                                 
5 There are other related forms of uncertainty about product payoff that have similar predictions.  Suppose that a 
component of the uncertainty is about whether the new idea is implemented well.  In this latter case, the star 
programmers may be those that implement the idea well (e.g., without problematic bugs or other product market 
features that would have an adverse impact on the returns from the product). 
6 Similar ideas have been raised before, notably by Prendergast (2000, 2002).   9 
two outcomes, a good outcome with probability P, and a bad outcome with probability (1-P).  
The uncertainty derives from the fact that software engineers and managers do not know which 
projects are good and which are bad.  As a result, they can make two types of error:  “false 
positive errors” in accepting projects that they believe are good, H’, but that later turn out to be 
bad; and “false negative errors”, 1-H, in which they can reject a project that would have turned 
out to be a good project.  More specifically, 
 
  1-H ￿ 1-Probability (accepting a project | project it is actually good) ￿ false negative 
 
  H’ ￿ Probability (accepting a project | project it is actually bad) ￿ false positive 
 
If the firm chooses to undertake a good project and it pays off, the firm earns $X.  If, on the other 
hand, the firm chooses to undertake a project that turns out to be a bad one, it costs the firm -$Y.  
The firm has zero costs and zero revenue if rejects projects early.  Given these probabilities and 
net revenues, the expected payoff for the firm is  
 
  E(payoff) = PHX – (1-P)H’Y + P(1-H)*0 +(1-P)(1-H’)*0 
 
  E(payoff) = PHX – (1-P)H’Y  
 
Firms that achieve a high payoff are those that have a high value of PHX.  Firms that fail, 
meanwhile, are those that have a high value of the losses (1-P)H’Y.   
So what is the value of talent or skills in these firms?  Lazear (2005) defines a star as one 
who has a higher probability of accepting good projects when they really are good, and a lower 
probability of accepting bad projects. This star ability could come from innate talent, or it could 
be developed as human capital on the job through learning, or it could arise from higher effort in 
response  to  incentives.  In  any  event,  star  managers  must  pick  or  accept  projects  and  star 
programmers  must  develop  (or  create)  great  projects.  Both  sets  of  skills  are  important 
determinants of success in the software industry.  Thus,  
 
(H + ￿) ￿ Star worker’s Probability (accepting or developing a project  ￿project is 
actually good) 
 
(H’ - ￿) ￿ Star worker’s Probability (accepting or developing a project  ￿project is 
actually bad) 
   10 
where high ￿ is the measure of the quality of the star – the talent that person has in picking 
projects relative to non-stars.   
Therefore, the value of selecting a star employee relative to a non-star employee is the 
incremental expected payoff,  ￿: 
 
￿ ￿ value of selecting a star 
 
￿ = [P(H + ￿) X – (1-P) (H’ - ￿)Y] – [PHX – (1-P)H’Y] 
 
￿ = ￿ [PX – (1-P)Y] 
 
Hence, firms in high variance payoff markets value star talent the most, since firms that have 
either high potential payoffs from good project selection (large $X), or large potential losses 
from bad project selection (large -$Y), gain from having stars with extra talent ￿.   
This implication is illustrated using a continuous distribution of payoffs in Figure 2.  The 
continuous distribution of payoffs is consistent with the model above; one can think about any 
given firm having a range of projects with different payoffs but with each project having the type 
of payoffs and probabilities previously described. The bold line in the Figure 2A shows a high 
variance  payoff  distribution  and  the  bold  line  in  Figure  2B  shows  a  low-variance  payoff 
distribution.  The dotted (or blue) line is the change in the distribution from star talent.  The left 
tail shifts right due to stars because there are reductions in false positives; that is, for any given 
project, the star reduces by ￿ the probability H’ of losing (1-P)Y  (so the star does not approve or 
produce projects that later fail because they were “truly” not good projects).  The right tail shifts 
right because the star reduces the number of false negatives; that is, for any given project, the 
star increases by ￿ the probability H of accepting a project that is good and has payoff PX.  Thus, 
by shifting the payoff distribution to the right, the mean payoff rises from PA1 to PA2 in the 
payoff distribution of Figure 2A. This is the gain to paying for or hiring stars—and that gain 
must exceed the cost of the star employee. Figure 2B depicts a narrower underlying project 
payoff distribution, which would arise when projects are less risky and thus losses and gains are 
smaller.  When  a  star  shifts  this  low-risk  payoff  distribution  due  to  their  talent  or  project 
assessment, the mean gains are smaller; in that case, the gains are PB2 – PB1.  As is evident in the 
figures, the gains to stars are smaller in low-risk product markets than in high risk: (PB2 - PB1) < 
(PA2 - PA1).  In sum, stars are more valuable in high-risk product markets of Figure 2A than in   11 
low-risk product markets of Figure 2B, because there are bigger gains (or lower losses) to the 
assessment or discovery of great projects in high-risk markets.   
Figure 2: Shifts in the Payoff Distribution Due to Reductions in False Positive or False 
Negative Errors 
Figure 2A: More Risky Payoff Distribution 
 
Figure 2B: Less Risky Payoff Distribution 
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Primary Hypothesis: Firms operating in product markets that have high variance payoffs 
should  pay  higher  wages,  because  these  firms  hire  and  reward  more  highly  talented 
software workers.   
 
Underlying this hypothesis is the idea that firms in high variance product markets have 
human resource practices that select, develop, and reward highly skilled software workers. We 
do not observe firms’ human resource practices, but we do observe in our data all the wages 
within each software firm, which in turn reflect these practices.  We explore the relationship 
between the variance of product market payoffs and various dimensions of the wage structure.   
Given this primary hypothesis, an open question is what mechanisms firms with high 
variance product markets will use to attract and retain stars.  For example, do firms spend a lot of 
resources selecting star workers very carefully, or they do they spend a lot of resources training 
workers on the job and providing strong incentives that reward (and sort) star workers over time 
as they gain experience with the firm?
7  The simple model above is silent about whether such 
firms will reward star workers though high initial wages or through sharply rising wage-tenure 
profiles (potentially via bonuses or stock options).  However, as is evident from Table 1 and the 
discussion  in  Section  2,  our  data  permit  us  to  make  these  distinctions,  and  we  examine  the 
differences  in  our  empirical  analysis.  In  our  discussion  of  the  results,  we  provide  some 
interpretation and suggestions on the ways this type of model could be extended to address these 
issues.   
4. Data  
In order to study the connection between the structure of firm’s product strategies and 
skill demand, it is necessary to build a data set with detailed information on the earnings and 
employment histories of workers as well as on the product market characteristics for the firms at 
which these workers are employed. We take advantage of the existence of a unique employer-
employee  matched  data  set  constructed  and  maintained  by  the  U.S.  Census  Bureau’s 
Longitudinal  Employer-Household  Dynamics  (LEHD)  Program,  and  augment  it  with  highly 
detailed firm characteristics from the Economic Census and worker characteristics from the 2000 
Decennial Census. Appendix 1 provides further details on each of these data sets as well as on 
our approach to integrating the data.  
                                                 
7 Note that an additional way firms can reward star performers is by putting them on the best projects, or giving 
them time to do their own publishable work. Stern (2004) shows that star scientist ‘pay’ to be on the best projects by 
taking lower wages in exchange for preferred work.     13 
The Prepackaged Software Industry 
We test the hypotheses of our model by focusing on the prepackaged software industry, 
which corresponds to the four-digit SIC 7372 (NAICS 5112). This narrow focus has a number of 
key advantages. The first is the payoff structure: the software industry is characterized by high 
variance, which is vividly illustrated by the video game example in Table 2.  As we show below 
in our results, there are substantial rewards to producing “hot” products. The second is the link 
between the firm and the product, which are closely intertwined in this industry.  The software 
firm is an R&D intensive unit with a potentially high variance payoff to innovation; by contrast, 
many  traditional  industries,  such  as  automobile  manufacturing,  while  characterized  by  R&D 
intensive  segments,  are  not  innovative  across  the  board.  An  additional  related  advantage  of 
studying the software industry is the  ability to trace directly the performance of its primary 
employees, including software developers and managers, and to link employee performance to 
the payoff structure of the firm.  In other industries, the “knowledge” workers are a smaller 
component of employment and have a less direct impact on the output of their firms. 
   A  final  advantage  of  studying  software  is  the  richness  of  the  available  data.  In  the 
Economic Census surveys it conducts every five years, the Census Bureau collects a broad array 
of  information  on  firms  that  produce  software.  The  data  collected  for  the  software  industry 
include detailed product-line information (described below) that we use to construct a measure 
capturing the variation in the payoff structure by product.  These data also provide measures of 
the size and age of software firms.
8 These are likely to be important controls that are correlated 
with product market strategies.  
The Dataset on Software Workers and Establishments 
The data on software workers is derived from the larger database of individual records 
within  firms  created  by  the  Longitudinal  Household-Employer  Dynamics  (LEHD)  project 
housed  at  the  Census  Bureau.  The  LEHD’s  longitudinal  wage  database  is  derived  from  the 
quarterly  records  of  the  employment  and  earnings  of  individuals  from  the  unemployment 
insurance (UI) systems data, matched to internal administrative records containing information 
on workers’ date of birth, race, and sex.   
                                                 
8 We thank Ron Jarmin for kindly sharing information on firm and establishment ages with the LEHD Program for 
this project.   14 
These data have several advantages.  First, since the scope of the LEHD data is virtually 
the full universe of employers and workers, the movements of workers through the earnings 
distributions within firms as well as across firms can be tracked accurately.  Second, the earnings 
data  represent  the  earnings  that  workers  are  actually  paid,  not  workers’  memories  of  their 
earnings.   
A  third  key  advantage  of  these  administrative  data  is  that  the  earnings  measures  are 
quarterly and include bonuses and exercised stock options.
9 Although the earnings information 
does not include fringe benefits, bonuses are included. Obviously, valuing stock options is quite 
difficult: in this case, the options are valued when they are exercised, or when the employee 
cashes in the options and receives the value.  We do not have data on when options are granted to 
employees.  However,  our  sense  is  that  the  exercised  options  available  in  our  data  are  the 
preferred measure of pay for our analysis, rather than options granted to employees.  Indeed, as 
Oyer and Schaefer (2002) point out, it takes four years for stock options to be fully vested, and as 
Russell  (2005)  notes,  for  a  typical  software  company,  options  are  worth  nothing  for  the 
employee’s first two years, and then are vested at a rate of two percent a month for the remaining 
three years.
10 Thus, the value of options granted depend on two uncertain outcomes – on whether 
the employee stays with the firm until the options are vested, and on the growth of the stock 
price of the company.   
It is important to emphasize that the LEHD data capture the full universe of covered 
employers and workers; they are not merely a sample of software workers or firms.
11  However, 
when we look at certain specific features of workers or of firms in the software industry, our data 
set becomes a smaller sample of the population of workers and firms.   
  Our basic universe of data workers follows 83,497 employment spells of workers who 
were employed in the software industry in ten states in the U.S. from approximately 1992 to 
2001  (the  exact  starting  years  vary  by  state).  This  length  of  time  enables  us  to  construct 
                                                 
9 No previous studies have included stock options data for a wide range of workers across firms. The nature of our 
data permit us to exploit the fact that in most employment contracts, employees must exercise all options within 90 
days of leaving the firm.  We are able to track the earnings of employees for those 90 days and we can thus capture 
the value of all exercised options.  
10 For very detailed analysis of options granted and other forms of pay within a large software company, see Russell 
(2005).  She shows, for example, that people who have large option grants are also likely to have exercised options 
(because they are older). 
11 There are important exceptions.  Most federal employment, and some agricultural and nonprofit employment is 
not covered. Independent contractors and self employed workers are similarly not covered.  See Stevens (2002) for a 
full discussion of coverage issues.   15 
sufficiently long worker earnings histories to address our research questions. Our primary results 
are based on two analytical datasets: one consisting of 51,589 employment spells and one of 
26,276 spells. These subsets are based on a number of decisions. First, we limit the data to 
workers between the ages 21 and 44 in order to model the demand for a fairly homogeneous 
collection of workers in the prime of their careers with similar educational vintages. This reduces 
the sample from 83,497 to 67,452. Second, we limit we limit our data to those workers making 
more than $50,000 at the end of their 1997 spell. The rationale for this is that UI data do not 
contain information on hours of work or occupation.  Therefore, to limit the data to workers who 
are likely to be full-time and in the more skilled occupations, we choose those making more than 
$50,000.  Appendix  1  contains  an  extensive  discussion  supporting  our  decision  to  limit  the 
sample in this way.  Together, the age and earnings limitations reduce the sample to 51,589 
spells.  Finally, while most businesses in our sample of workers could be successfully matched to 
the Economic Census, a smaller subset had complete information on the establishment, including 
size, age, sales, and detailed product line information. There are 26,276 spells for which we have 
complete information regarding firm characteristics as well as worker characteristics. All told, 
688 software firms are represented in this sample.
12  
  Lastly, we also construct a subset of data of employees in software occupations based on 
the occupational information in the 2000 Decennial Census.  For this sample, we limit or data to 
those individuals in the software industry who are software engineers, developers, or managers 
(irrespective  of  earnings),  dropping  those  who  are  in  other  occupations  within  the  software 
industry. Because the Decennial Census is a 1 in 6 sample of the population in 2000, our sample 
falls to 2,638 workers in software occupations.  This smaller dataset is used to check our results 
using the larger data set discussed above, and thus the results using these data are referred to in 
footnotes below.  
 Measuring Earnings Levels and Earnings Growth 
                                                 
12  Throughout  this  paper,  when  we  refer  to  a  firm,  we  are  referring  to  a  firm  defined  at  the  State  Employer 
Identification Number (the SEIN, or UI account number), which is the unit of observation in the UI-Wage data. It is 
an 11-digit number used for reporting taxes at the state level.  For single-unit firms, this reflects the entire firm, but 
for multi-unit firms, the SEIN reflects activity of the firm within a given state.  We are able to match the workers to 
information in to the Economic Censuses since the UI files also include the federal Employer Identification Number 
(the EIN is on the ES-202 data that is part of the related administrative data system). The EIN is a nine-digit number 
assigned  by  Internal  Revenue  Service  (IRS)  and  used  for  federal  tax  purposes  by  employers,  sole  proprietors, 
corporations,  partnerships,  non-profit  organizations,  trusts,  estates  of  decedents,  government  agencies,  certain 
individuals, and other business entities.   16 
  A major advantage of the administrative data is that they are longitudinal in both workers 
and firms. In other words, the data have information about spells of employment with a firm and 
the  associated  earnings  over  long  periods  of  time.  These  unique  data  permit  us  to  capture 
multiple facets of worker earnings profiles. In modeling the link between product markets and 
compensation,  we  use  information  on  workers’  earnings  trajectories  within  firms,  earnings 
growth associated with transitions between firms, and earnings levels for new and old workers in 
the firm. 
  We use four measures of earnings in the empirical analysis.  One measure is beginning-
of-spell earnings, which corresponds to a given worker’s total earnings in the first full quarter of 
employment with each employer (with the dollar values at annualized 2001 dollars).
13 The next 
set  of  measures  is  for  experienced  workers:  one  includes  end-of-spell  earnings,
14  which 
potentially contain exercised stock options, as workers must exercise their options within 90 days 
of quitting.  Another, which does not include exercised stock options, is earnings one year prior 
to the end of the spell. Finally, for those same workers for whom we observe a prior spell, we 
measure the level of earnings in the last full quarter of his or her prior job.  
  We use two measures of earnings growth. Earnings growth within the firm, or within-job 
earnings  growth,  is  the  difference  between  end-of-spell  and  beginning-of-spell  earnings.
15   
Between-job earnings growth is the difference between earnings in the first full quarter of a 
given worker’s new software job and the last full quarter of his or her prior job.
16   
Measuring the Product Market Payoff Dispersion for Firms 
Investigating the other important component of the hypothesis requires estimates of the 
variance of the expected payoff for the product market in which each firm operates.  For the 
prepackaged software industry, the 1997 Economic Census delineates 30 detailed product lines, 
ranging from consumer game and entertainment software to business graphics design and layout 
                                                 
13 Beginning-of-spell earnings capture new workers to the firm and censored data of new workers in our data. 
Sixteen percent of the beginning-of-spell earnings are censored.  
14 We measure this as a worker’s last full quarter of annualized earnings in a given spell.  End-of-spell earnings 
captures workers leaving the firm and censored data when our observations end. Forty percent of the end-of-spell 
earnings are censored.  
15  More  specifically,  within-job  earnings  growth  is  defined  as  log  annualized  end-of-spell  earnings  less  log 
annualized beginning-of-spell earnings, divided by the number of full quarters that a worker was on the job. 
16 More specifically, between-job earnings growth is defined as log annualized beginning-of-spell earnings in the 
new job less log annualized end-of-spell earnings in the old job, divided by the number of full quarters between jobs. 
Clearly, between-job earnings growth is only defined for those individuals in the sample for whom we observe them 
in a job prior to their software job (i.e., those whose software jobs are not left censored and those who are not recent 
entrants or re-entrants into the labor market).   17 
software  to  vertical  industry  banking  software  to  mainframe  computer  applications.   
Establishments in the Census are asked to provide data on its revenue for each of the thirty 
product  lines,  and  we  exploit  this  revenue  information  to  order  to  construct  a  measure  that 
reflects the variance of payoffs in each product category.   
Each firm’s Product Payoff Dispersion is created in two steps.  First, for each of the 
thirty product classes, we calculate the 90/50 ratio of the log of revenue per worker.  Because 
firms have multiple products, we treat each product within each firm as though it were a separate 
product revenue stream, and calculate the 90/50 ratio for the thirty product markets.  Second, for 
each firm, we calculate its payoff dispersion in the product markets in which it is operating by 
weighting the product-specific 90/50 ratios for the thirty products by the percent of revenue that 
the establishment has in each product class.  More specifically,  
 
Product Payoff Dispersionj = ￿k=1 [%Revenuejk](Product Revenue Dispersionk) 
 
where %Revenuejk is the percent of firm j’s revenue coming from product class k, for product 
classes k = 1, 2,…, 30.  The variance specific to product k across firms is calculated as a 90-50 
ratio of log revenue per worker: 
 
Product Revenue Dispersionk = ￿j=1 [ln(revenuejk /workerjk)
 90 - ln(revenuejk /workerjk)]
 50  
where the Product Revenue Dispersion for product k is calculated across all firms producing in 
product class k, where each product line within each firm is treated as if it is its own independent 
firm. See Appendix 1 for details.   
There are a few key features of the firm-specific Product Payoff Dispersion measure.  
First, this measure reflects each firm’s actual product mix, but not its actual revenue. The payoff 
measure reflects the skewness of revenue per worker in the product classes in which the firm 
operates.  A firm with a high Product Payoff Dispersion measure is not necessarily a high or low 
performing firm, but rather has a product mix with a right skewed distribution of payoffs.  Also 
notably, the measure of revenue dispersion in a given product line is the 90-50 ratio, because the 
90-50  ratio  is  a  simple  way  of  capturing  the  skewness  of  the  upper  tail  of  the  revenue 
distribution.  While our model in Section 3 refers to the variance of the entire distribution (thus 
the lower tail as well), we focus on the upper tail because we do not observe firm’s losses – 
revenues are truncated at zero.     18 
Table 3: Differences in Payoff Distributions By Product Line* 
Detailed 
Product 
Line Code  Detailed Product Line Description 
90/50 Ratio of 
Product Line 
Sales/Worker 
Detailed Product Lines in Software Publishing with Greatest Potential Payoffs/Risks 
1122  Game and Entertainment Software  1.31 
1183  Networking Software  1.17 
1123  Home Productivity Software  1.03 
Detailed Product Lines in Software Publishing with Smallest Potential Payoffs/Risks 
1161  Banking and Finance Software  0.66 
1142  Distribution Software  0.57 
1184  Database Software  0.55 
*Based on the national sample of firms. 
 
The means of the Product Payoff Dispersion are reported in Table 3 for the highest risk and the 
lowest risk product lines. The means in Table 3 suggest that one element of our model is borne 
out: there is variation in the skewness of revenues across product classes. 
5.  Empirical Model  
The  model  in  Section  3  implies  that  firms  operating  in  product  markets  with  highly 
dispersed payoffs will hire more highly talented (star) workers.  This model generates several 
testable hypotheses for the empirical analysis.   
Product-Specific Payoffs 
A standard human capital wage equation takes the following form:  
 
(1)  ln(W)ijt= a0 + a1Sijt + uijt 
 
where wages are a function of skills, Sijt (for person i, firm j, and time t), but the key skills in this 
case  (like  creativity  and  programming  talent)  are  unobserved  to  the  econometrician.
17  We 
hypothesize that highly skilled workers will sort to the high potential payoff firms that value 
skills the most. Thus, the payoff dispersion will serve as a measure of unobserved skills in the 
wage regression:  
 
(2)  ln(W)ijt= ￿0 + ￿1(￿
p
j) + ￿ijt 
 
 
                                                 
17 In this paper, we always control for observable skills, and in addition we select only workers earning more than 
$50K.   19 
where  ￿
p
jt  is  the  payoff  dispersion  or  variance  that  firm  faces  in  its  product  market(s).  The 
primary hypothesis in Section 3 implies that high payoff dispersion firms pay higher wages 
because they are selecting highly skilled star workers.   It is important to remember that the 
payoff dispersion measure captures the variance of payoffs in the firm’s product class(es), and 
does not represent the firm’s actual historical variance of success.   
Two issues are important to bear in mind n the empirical estimation of equation (2).  
First, ￿
p
j will not vary over time; it will be observed in one year and represent a firm-specific 
effect  identifying  the  product  class  or  classes  of  the  firm.  Second,  a  number  of  controls, 
discussed later, are included for other factors that may affect firm wages. Of these, perhaps the 
most important is the fact that we control for a measure of the actual payoff of the firm using 
output revenue per worker. It is thus less likely that the estimate of a1 reflects profit or rent 
sharing.    
We consider a number of refinements of the benchmark specification (2).  One is the 
incorporation of the idea that wages should be more sensitive to the firm’s payoff dispersion for 
more  highly  skilled  workers.  In  software  companies,  it  is  the  top  talent  (or  the  brilliant 
programmers) who should be paid the most for their skills in the firms operating in product 
markets with high payoff dispersion.  By contrast, pay for low-wage workers should not be a 
function of the firm’s payoff dispersion (because worker sorting is irrelevant).  This suggests 
estimating a quantile regression of the following form:   
 
(2’)  ln(W)ijt= ￿0 + ￿1
skill(￿
p
j) + ￿ijt 
 
and examining ￿1
skill to determine whether there is rising sensitivity to payoff potential with skill 
at each point in the wage distribution.
18 
Another refinement of the model is the investigation of the impact of product variance on 
different facets of compensation – both in terms of levels and growth.  There are a number of 
reasons why our current model would predict that high product variance firms would offer high 
base pay that rises sharply with tenure.  Such firms might offer higher base pay because they 
                                                 
18 This point is also made in Buchinsky’s (1994) model of wages in which he shows that the returns to education are 
higher at high wage quantiles, though the returns to experience are lower at high wage quantiles. Hallock et al. 
(2004) show that among CEOs, the sensitivity of wages to firm performance rises as one moves up the earnings 
distribution.   20 
value  skills  or  talent  more  than  do  other  firms  and  use  this  approach  to  select  more  highly 
talented people. Similarly, we would predict that pay should rise with tenure due to sorting; as in 
all matching models, the return to tenure would be high because stars are both retained and are 
paid more over time while the losers are fired.  Greater human capital investment is another 
reason to expect wages to grow over time. Firms in high variance product markets may also pay 
more for effort; that is, firms may have steep incentive pay contracts.
19 Teamwork is another 
reason we might expect wages to rise over time; if people are working in teams in which their 
skills are likely to be complementary with the other team members, then it may take time before 
an employer can identify and reward individual star talent. Lastly, literature on the software 
industry suggests that firms in the sector want teams to stay together for the product cycle, that 
they do not want to lose star talent, and that they want to provide incentives for effort.
20 Software 
firms therefore intentionally tie employees to the firm by granting stock options that vest slowly 
(typically over four years); this further steepens the wage-tenure profile for workers. In sum, it is 
likely that firms operating high variance product markets pay more for loyalty, compensating 
their employees for staying with the firm more so than firms in low-variance product markets.   
We use the different measures of earnings in our dataset to investigate whether these 
outcomes occur. In particular, we examine what the rewards for talent are in terms of beginning-
of-spell earnings, end-of-spell earnings, one-year prior to end of spell (which is not likely to 
include exercised stock options), and prior spell earnings.  In a closely related fashion, we also 
explore the relationship between product market payoff variance and earnings growth.
21  
Could a positive coefficient, ￿1 on ￿
p
j, in (2) and the related specifications simply reflect 
a compensating differential for risk rather than a firm strategy to attract and retain stars? There 
are a number of different factors that suggest that this possibility is unlikely.  Most importantly, 
risk differentials are not consistent with the typical structure of earnings in the software industry.  
Typically, workers in software are rewarded for upside gains, but they are not penalized for 
losses – base pay typically does not fall when the firm loses money. Therefore, software workers 
usually choose between two alternative pay packages in job offers: (a) low base pay but high 
performance-based pay or (b) high base pay but little possibility of rewards if the worker or 
                                                 
19 In fact, case study evidence suggests that they do – a larger percent of a workers’ pay is performance based as the 
skill level rises (Russell 2005) 
20 See, for example, Russell (2005), Cusumano and Selby (1995), Hoch et al. (2000), and Stross (1997). 
21 A particular advantage of using the latter as the dependent variable in (2) is that it permits us to abstract from 
unobserved fixed factors that influence the level of earnings.   21 
company does well.  Firms operating in high variance product markets who want to induce high 
performance by offering incentive contracts would therefore offer contract (a), and hence high 
variance firms will have lower starting salaries, or base pay, than firms in low-variance product 
markets. By contrast, our model states that firms operating in high variance product markets will 
want to select the highest quality workers, and quality is unobserved to the econometrician, so 
these firms will have higher starting salaries (which are base pay) than firms in low-variance 
product  markets.  In  sum,  a  positive  value  of  ￿1  resulting  from  estimating  equation  (2)  with 
starting salaries as the dependent variable, is likely to reflect a return to skills, not a return to risk 
taking.
22 However, high pay at the end of a job spell could reflect a return to risk taking – if the 
worker had taken a lower starting salary with the hope of future uncertain gains.
23   
In addition to the conceptual argument above, there are two technical reasons why it is 
unlikely that a positive value of ￿1 would reflect a compensating risk differential.  For one, in all 
specifications we include as a control a measure of the worker turnover at the firm, which can be 
interpreted as a control for job security.  For another, we consider alternative specifications that 
                                                 
22 There is one way in which a firm’s losses will translate into lower pay for the worker – the worker will get fired 
and lose their returns to firm-specific human capital if the firm fails.  But this too should produce a compensating 
wage-risk differential for experienced workers, not for young workers who have yet to invest in firm-specific skills.  
The lore in this industry is that there are workers who are risk-takers – who seek firms who might produce big hits 
as in our model – and that these risk-takers accept jobs that offer lower starting salaries for their skills, but that 
might produce big income gains. Using extensive data for one large software company, Russell (2005) shows that 
within the firm, pay levels, bonuses, and options are highly correlated across individuals, reflecting the fact that 
more able workers have higher pay of every kind than the less skilled.  
23 Note also that in jobs with a higher variance of returns for firms, some models would produce the conclusion that 
there should be less incentive pay in these high variance markets.  Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) show that when 
the variance of stock market returns rises for a company, the percent of pay at risk (or performance pay) falls for top 
executives—there is a negative relationship between riskiness and pay.  But they have a different kind of risk in 
mind, and their data measure a different kind of risk—their riskiness is the variance in stock returns due to noise or 
uncontrollable outcomes.  It is true that in a tournaments model of incentive pay, increasing the amount of noise or 
luck reduces the use of incentive pay (Lazear and Rosen 1981).  In our model, the variance of payoff outcomes 
could arise in part from an idiosyncratic shock representing noise or luck, but most importantly arises because some 
firms hire smarter people who select more successful products and should have pay tied to performance.  In the data, 
we cannot identify  whether the variance in the payoff arises from luck or effort, but our  model of innovation 
proposes that it is high skill that produces high payoffs (not luck), so the coefficient ￿1 on ￿
p
j, should be positive, not 
negative. Prendergast (2000, 2002) also makes the point that higher risk environments may have more performance 
based pay, not less, because in those environments, the cost of determining what inputs to monitor is greater than the 
cost of utilizing output performance based pay. Since the source of the variance in payoffs cannot be identified (and 
we  do  not  have  time-series  data  product-specific  variances  or  firm-specific  variances),  we  turn  to  the  data  to 
determine the sign.  For related empirical models of the risk-pay incentive relationships, for executives see Baker 
and Hall (2004), Core et al. (2003), Ittner et al. (2003), Murphy (1986), Schaefer (1998), and Wulf (2005); for 
reviews, see Hallock and Murphy (1999) and Murphy (1999).   
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explore the worker’s earnings on her prior job spell, reasoning that if firms are paying for talent 
rather than risk-taking, we should observe higher earnings on prior spell jobs.   
5.  Empirical Results 
The Earnings Levels of Software Workers 
The wage regression results in Table 4 explore the relationship between earnings levels 
and within-job earnings growth rates with the firm’s product payoff dispersion (the revenue-
weighted 90-50 percentile ratio of revenue per person across the product markets in which the 
firm  operates).    All  wage  regressions  control  for  the  person’s  tenure,  censoring  of observed 
tenure,  and  age.  Regressions  in  every  second  column  also  control  for  firm  age,  firm  size, 
indicators of the density, education and industrial diversification of the county and in the worker 
outcome regressions dummies for quarters of accessions and separations to abstract from any 
macro effects, and the churning rate of jobs in the firm.
24  
Looking  at  the  regressions  for  experienced  workers  earnings  (columns  1  and  2)  and 
starting salaries (columns 3 and 4), it is clear that the product payoff dispersion variable has a 
very  significant  positive  effect  on  each  measure  of  earnings  at  all  points  of  the  earnings 
distribution  except  the  very  bottom.    Thus,  even  among  new  hires,  firms  with  high  payoff 
dispersion pay higher wages, suggesting that they select more skilled workers. This is consistent 
with the extensive industry testimony that describes the software industry’s very careful and 
deliberate  hiring  practices,  all  aimed  at  identifying  the  right  talent  and  reflecting  the  high-
commitment work environment of the industry (Hoch, et.al., 2000).  As discussed above, the 
positive coefficient on dispersion for starting salaries is not consistent with the notion that firms 
pay a compensating wage differential for risk taking: this would have resulted in a negative 
coefficient.  
                                                 
24 The dependent variable in these regressions is the earnings residual for each spell in the sample, where the 
residual is  from a regression of log earnings on quadratics of  tenure at job, tenure in industry, and age, fully 
interacted with each other and with appropriate left and right censoring dummies. See the wage regression results in 
Appendix 2.  Using the residual is equivalent to introducing these controls in the wage regression, but the residual is 
more intuitively appealing than raw earnings because it reflects only that component of earnings that cannot be 
accounted for by basic observable worker characteristics. We also appeal to the residual in the star probability 
regressions used below.  When the churning rate is added, it is defined as the accession rate plus the separation rate 
less the absolute value of the net growth rate of employment at the firm.   This churning or excess worker turnover 
rate is included as a control, since churning may be part of the interaction of product mix and internal labor market 
strategies that in turn impact the structure of wages.  For example, high-risk product strategies may be associated 
with a high worker turnover.  By including this control, we mitigate concerns that the payoff potential variable is 
capturing a compensating differential for high turnover.   23 
A comparison of the wage results for experienced workers earnings (columns 1 and 2) 
and starting salaries (columns 3 and 4) reveals that earnings are much more sensitive to the 
product  payoff  dispersion  for  experienced  workers  than  for  new  hires.    The  earnings  for 
experienced workers can be very large by the end of their spell with the firm: 10 percent of 
software workers earn more than $310,000 at the end of their spells (Table 1). The very large 
wage  payoffs  for  experienced  workers  could  reflect  a  number  of  factors:  higher  marginal 
products (as in our model), a tournament reward structure, participation in a high-performance 
team, or improved selection of talented workers over time in the firm.  We cannot identify the 
differences, but Russell (2005) provides very detailed evidence for one software company that 
suggests that all of these factors enter the earnings of software workers.
25 The point is that in 
each case, the person who can create or pick the best projects will have more skills and more 
incentive pay in firms with high product payoff dispersion.     
The  regression  results  for  experienced  workers  may  be  heavily  influenced  by  the 
inclusion of exercised stock options in the earnings measure.  To test the sensitivity of our results 
to the inclusion of options, we run an additional regression in which experienced earnings are 
redefined as those for people one year before they quit their job or prior to dropping out of our 
sample due to censoring (since options are most likely to be exercised when departing a firm.  
The magnitudes of the coefficients in the experienced-earnings regressions decline somewhat, 
but the basic results remain.    
As a further check, we develop  an entirely  different measure of workers’ underlying 
talent, by measuring talent based only on the worker’s history prior to the current job.  That is we 
regress each worker’s pay from his job prior to 1997 on the characteristics of his job in 1997.  
The hypothesis is that if high payoff software firms in 1997 are sorting for the highest skilled 
                                                 
25 All indications are that the firm in Russell’s (2005) study looks very much like the typical large firm in our data – 
the median age is 33 and tenure ranges from 2.7 to 3.1 over 1996 to 1999, and about 65 percent were in research and 
development and 30 percent in management or administration.  Though no previous studies are available describing 
in detail the forms of incentive pay for software workers, Russell (2005) provides evidence form a case study of one 
large software firm.  She shows that pay is a function three things – base pay and the merit increases in base, 
bonuses, and stock options.  In this firm, individual pay levels and individual deferred pay is very highly positively 
correlated  within  the  firm  (Russell  2005,  Figure  23).  This  example  suggests  that  software  companies  use  a 
combination of promotion-based pay, as in a tournaments model, of individual-level incentive pay, and of group-
based incentive pay. Since these forms of performance pay rise with the grade level and rise the pay level in the 
firm, they suggest that performance bonuses are higher for star employees, both in their allocation (as in options 
granted) and in the realization (as in the value of bonuses and exercisable options).  As a result, in our wage 
regressions, the wage growth or levels should contain a portion of wage gains that are attributable to performance-
based pay (as will be described in more detail below).   
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workers when they hire them, then each worker’s pay in his previous job will be a function of his 
future firm-type as a measure of his underlying talent.  Therefore, we estimate wage regressions 
for the subsample of workers with an observed prior employment spell and examine relationship 
between current firm product payoff and prior spell earnings.  The results here (columns (7) and 
(8)) are less strong, but at the median we find a positive and statistically significant impact that is 
quite similar in magnitude to the results for beginning of spell at the median.  It makes sense that 
there is less of a systematic pattern for the low and high percentiles, as the theory is about how 
the risk-taking firm should especially compensate the most skilled workers.  That is, the firm in 
the prior spell (which may be a firm of any type including a non-software firm) is unlikely to be 
rewarding  especially  skilled  workers  in  the  same  fashion  as  the  current  risk-taking  software 
firm.
26  
The findings in Table 4 show that the impact of the payoff potential rises with skill level; 
that is, software workers at the upper reaches of the earnings distribution gain the most from 
working in high variance payoff firms, though workers at the median gain as well.
27 The sharply 
increasing impact of the payoff potential is illustrated in Figure 3 for experienced workers the 
coefficient  at  the  90
th  percentile  is  more  than  twice  as  large  as  the  coefficient  at  the  10
th 




                                                 
26 There is an econometric concern for these specifications given sample selection (not all workers in our sample 
have an observed prior spell).  We have considered in unreported results selection corrected results (using least 
squares methods instead of quantile regressions) and found results consistent with those for the median as reported 
in columns (7) and (8). 
27  In  Hallock  et  al.  (2004,  page  7),  they  point  out  that  “higher  ability  managers  [would  have]  higher  pay  for 
performance incentives than low ability managers” due to the lower cost of effort for high ability managers.    25  Table 4: Quantile Regressions for Earnings Level Residuals for Software Spells 
  
End of Spell Earnings            
"Experienced Earnings" 
Beginning of Spell Earnings   
  "Starting Salaries"  
One-Year Prior Earnings "Lagged 
Earnings" 
Prior-Spell Ending Earnings 
"Prior-Spell Earnings" 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
   All Firms  All Firms  All Firms  All Firms  All Firms  All Firms  All Firms  All Firms 
Tenth Percentile 
Product Payoff Dispersion +  0.3226  0.3068  -0.1693  -0.0678  0.1070  0.0456  -0.0666  -0.0309 
   (0.0481)**  (0.0460)**  (0.0434)**  (0.0570)  (0.0453)*  (0.0494)  (0.1304)  (0.1335) 
Log Revenue per Worker  0.0622  0.0288  0.0386  0.0385  0.0485  0.0290  0.0358  0.0841 
   (0.0045)**  (0.0104)**  (0.0045)**  (0.0066)**  (0.0043)**  (0.0079)**  (0.0140)*  (0.0236)** 
Firm Average Worker Churn  1.1692  1.4403  0.9172  0.4170  0.5065  0.8833  0.4196  0.3350 
   (0.1354)**  (0.1534)**  (0.1651)**  (0.1691)*  (0.1293)**  (0.1441)**  (0.4428)  (0.4655) 
Fiftieth Percentile 
Product Payoff Dispersion +  0.3750  0.3715  0.1469  0.1631  0.2701  0.2581  0.1487  0.1305 
   (0.0450)**  (0.0480)**  (0.0372)**  (0.0346)**  (0.0513)**  (0.0515)**  (0.0566)**  (0.0583)* 
Log Revenue per Worker  0.1477  0.0874  0.0332  0.0457  0.0883  0.0634  0.0101  0.0315 
   (0.0043)**  (0.0079)**  (0.0026)**  (0.0057)**  (0.0037)**  (0.0076)**  (0.0063)  (0.0107)** 
Firm Average Worker Churn  2.7335  3.3058  0.8869  0.7091  2.6445  2.8104  0.7588  0.8171 
   (0.1423)**  (0.1555)**  (0.0894)**  (0.1016)**  (0.1490)**  (0.1326)**  (0.1929)**  (0.1981)** 
Ninetieth Percentile 
Product Payoff Dispersion +  0.7420  0.7218  0.2083  0.2841  0.6391  0.5398  0.2452  0.1252 
   (0.0962)**  (0.1180)**  (0.0457)**  (0.0563)**  (0.0930)**  (0.1002)**  (0.0746)**  (0.0811) 
Log Revenue per Worker  0.6406  0.1469  0.0820  0.0626  0.2847  0.1372  0.0460  0.0473 
   (0.0171)**  (0.0168)**  (0.0041)**  (0.0078)**  (0.0116)**  (0.0128)**  (0.0082)**  (0.0149)** 
Firm Average Worker Churn  1.3797  3.9577  0.8751  1.7865  1.5848  3.1629  1.3327  1.7670 
   (0.2876)**  (0.2621)**  (0.1460)**  (0.1492)**  (0.2843)**  (0.2583)**  (0.2571)**  (0.2558)** 
Ninety-Fifth Percentile 
Product Payoff Dispersion +  1.0363  0.6729  0.2803  0.2902  0.6727  0.6290  0.1156  0.0252 
   (0.2365)**  (0.1689)**  (0.0677)**  (0.0727)**  (0.1260)**  (0.1425)**  (0.1181)  (0.1140) 
Log Revenue per Worker  0.8205  0.1378  0.1107  0.0748  0.4431  0.1137  0.0311  0.0486 
   (0.0166)**  (0.0322)**  (0.0073)**  (0.0153)**  (0.0159)**  (0.0229)**  (0.0131)*  (0.0207)* 
Firm Average Worker Churn  0.9527  4.2284  0.6759  2.0844  1.3174  3.4670  1.1724  1.9094 
   (0.3737)*  (0.4450)**  (0.2310)**  (0.2331)**  (0.3657)**  (0.3663)**  (0.4161)**  (0.3594)** 
Controls++  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  26276  26276  26276  26276  26276  26276  10803  10803 
All dependent variables are wage residuals from regression controlling for age and tenure (see Appendix 2).  Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Marginal Effects are 
reported. 
+ Weighted 90/50 Ratio of Log Revenue per Worker in Firm' s Product Lines ++ Controls include (log) firm employment; (log) firm employment squared;  Dummies for firm age (<6 years old, 6-10 years 
old, 11+ years old, with <6 omitted); firm employment growth rate; a dummy for whether the firm is in a high density, high education,   and industrially diversified county; and year and quarter job 




We  also  report  some  of  the  coefficients  on  the  controls  that  are  of  particular  interest.  First, 
consider the effect of the firm’s actual revenues on the different earnings measures. The earnings 
regression results show that workers are paid more when the firm does succeed; indeed, pay rises 
very significantly as a function of the firm’s actual log revenue per employee.
28 The quantile 
analysis also suggests that high-wage workers are paid more for the firm’s success.
29  Note that 
this should be interpreted as a firm-specific fixed effect: the firm that is highly productive in 
1997 (when we measure the firm’s revenues) pays more to workers in adjacent years as well.  
We also find that firm’s pay is increasing in the amount of worker churning.  This control is 
another variable that helps capture effects that may be associated with compensating differentials 
since this is a control for job security.  Our finding that the product market payoff dispersion 
results are robust to the inclusion of this control provides yet more evidence that the impact of 
                                                 
28 In interpreting these results, it is useful again to emphasize that, while the product mix payoff risk measure varies 
across firms, it is not driven by the realized payoffs of the firm but rather the potential payoff distribution based 
upon the pool of firms with that product mix. This feature substantially mitigates concerns of contemporaneous 
endogeneity of the payoff mix measure.  This payoff risk measure does reflect a choice by the firm (i.e., the choice 
of product mix), but this choice is likely made either at the founding of the firm or, at the very least, is made 
infrequently. After controlling for firm performance, the effects of the product market payoff remain unchanged, 
which should further reduce concerns about endogeneity.  
29 For descriptions of forms of incentive pay for other knowledge workers, and models and empirical results, for the 
CEO literature, see Hallock and Murphy (1999), Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Jensen and Murphy (1990), and 
Murphy (1999).     27 
the  latter  variable  is  associated  with  attracting  and  retaining  star  workers  rather  than 
compensating for risk. 
In sum, the quantile regressions show that earnings are higher when firms operate in high 
variance product markets and that earnings are higher when firms succeed by achieving high 
revenues.  Moreover, those workers at the upper end of the earnings distribution are rewarded 
disproportionately when firms operate in high variance product markets and when firms succeed 
by achieving high revenues. These results are robust when we look at different measures of 
income as well as when we subset the data substantially to only look at individuals who are 
software programmers (thus excluding all managers and all other well-paid employees).
30  
The Earnings Growth Rates for Software Workers 
The main results on the impact of payoff potential are mimicked when we use within-job 
earnings growth as the dependent variable instead of the earnings level (columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 5).  Within-job earnings growth rises sharply with the potential payoff of the firm, and this 
impact is greatest for the highest earnings quantiles. In contrast, between-job earnings growth 
(columns 3 and 4) is not a function of the potential success of the firm: workers are rewarded for 
staying with the firm but not for hopping between firms. For the median worker, the effect of 
payoff potential for between-job earnings growth is actually negative, but at higher earnings 
quantiles,  it  is  insignificant.  Thus,  even  though  starting  salaries  are  higher  for  individuals 
working in high variance product classes (columns 3 and 4 of Table 4), firms in these high 
variance industries do not appear to be stealing stars from other firms by offering high starting 
salaries.  Of course, we cannot observe whether firms are stealing stars by offering high stock 
option grants.  But the point remains that even if they are, the stars typically stay with the firm 
four or more years to have their options pay out, and the stars must succeed at what they are 
doing. Job-hopping for higher future earnings may be a common strategy, but such job-hopping 
is not a viable short-term strategy for wage growth. In this sense, loyalty pays – workers must 
stay with firms to achieve income growth. 
                                                 
30 This is based on a match of the LEHD data to the long form of the 2000 Decennial Census data. The sample size 
is reduced substantially, which is why the match is not used in subsequent analysis.   28 
 Table 5: Quantile Regressions for Growth Rate Residuals for Software Spells 
  Within Job Earnings Growth  Between Job Earnings Growth 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   All Firms  All Firms  All Firms  All Firms 
Tenth Percentile 
Product Payoff Dispersion +  -0.0055  -0.0063  -0.2828  -0.1768 
   (0.0068)  (0.0083)  (0.0676)**  (0.0567)** 
Log Revenue per Worker  0.0034  -0.0040  -0.0216  0.0232 
   (0.0008)**  (0.0016)*  (0.0080)**  (0.0124) 
Firm Average Worker Churn   0.0271  0.1419  0.1269  -0.0886 
   (0.0207)  (0.0272)**  (0.2350)  (0.2488) 
Fiftieth Percentile 
Product Payoff Dispersion +  0.0882  0.0716  -0.2070  -0.1636 
   (0.0077)**  (0.0078)**  (0.0291)**  (0.0356)** 
Log Revenue per Worker  0.0162  0.0015  0.0054  0.0254 
   (0.0008)**  (0.0009)  (0.0032)  (0.0059)** 
Firm Average Worker Churn   0.2539  0.3678  0.2765  0.1494 
   (0.0257)**  (0.0166)**  (0.1031)**  (0.1167) 
Ninetieth Percentile 
Product Payoff Dispersion +  0.2543  0.2949  -0.2194  -0.1650 
   (0.0264)**  (0.0346)**  (0.0939)*  (0.0873) 
Log Revenue per Worker  0.0887  0.0245  0.0057  -0.0042 
   (0.0027)**  (0.0047)**  (0.0097)  (0.0174) 
Firm Average Worker Churn   0.6998  1.1196  0.5118  0.6335 
   (0.0762)**  (0.1063)**  (0.3064)  (0.3640) 
Ninety-Fifth Percentile 
Product Payoff Dispersion +  0.2251  0.3123  -0.1651  -0.2133 
   (0.0435)**  (0.0519)**  (0.2776)  (0.2728) 
Log Revenue per Worker  0.1125  0.0369  0.0232  0.0228 
   (0.0040)**  (0.0091)**  (0.0269)  (0.0473) 
Firm Average Worker Churn   0.7821  1.4663  0.8609  1.1838 
   (0.1194)**  (0.1655)**  (0.6226)  (0.6138) 
Controls++  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  26276  26276  10803  10803 
All dependent variables are wage residuals from regression controlling for age and tenure (see Appendix 2).   
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
+ Weighted 90/50 Ratio of Log Revenue per Worker in Firm' s Product Lines ++ Controls include (log) firm 
employment; (log) firm employment squared; Dummies for firm age (<6 years old, 6-10 years old, 11+ years old, with 
<6 omitted); firm employment growth rate; a dummy for whether the firm is in a high density, high education,  and 
industrially diversified county; and year and quarter job separation dummies. 
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How Much Do High Payoff Firms Pay for Stars?  
The results in Tables 4 and 5 show that firms operating in high variance product classes 
pay higher wages.  How much more do they pay, and to whom?  
Table 6 shows the predicted value of earnings for alternative combinations of worker 
wage classes and firm product market classes. The five columns represent the three wage classes: 
starting salary for the typical median worker; starting salary for the worker at the 90
th wage 
percentile; experienced-worker salary for the median worker; the experienced-worker salary for 
the experienced worker in the 90
th wage percentile; and in the last column the annual earnings 
growth rates for median workers. The rows represent product classes across the extremes of 
variance: the first row is firms in the lowest variance product class (mainframe applications, with 
a product payoff dispersion of 0.55); the median product class (with a payoff dispersion of 1.00); 
and the high variance product class (video games, with a product payoff dispersion of 1.33).  
Thus, the middle row of the table anchors the different earnings measures at the actual median 
values of our data. 
   
Table 6: Predicted Earnings and Earnings Growth from Table 5 Regressions 
 
  
Beginning of Spell Earnings              
"Starting Salaries" 




   Median  90th Percentile  Median  90th Percentile  Median 
Low Product Payoff Dispersion  $54,394  $94,845  $80,285  $195,047  9.51% 
Database software:               90/50 Ratio =.55 
Median Product Payoff Dispersion  $58,000  $108,000  $95,000  $311,000  13.32% 
(90/50 Ratio=1.00)                
High Product Payoff Dispersion  $61,023  $118,184  $107,581  $437,573  15.90% 
Game/Entertainment Software:  90/50 Ratio 1.31) 
 
 
The  predicted  values  of  Table  6  display  two  pronounced  conclusions  from  the 
regressions.  First,  firms  operating  in  high-risk  product  classes  pay  more  for  talent,  even  in 
starting salaries.  For the median worker, starting salaries rise from $54,394 to $61,023 moving 
from low to high product class dispersion firms.  More important, for the high skilled worker in 
the  90
th  wage  percentile,  starting  salaries  rise  from  $94,845  to  $118,184.    Second,  earnings 
growth is dramatically higher in firms operating in high dispersion product classes.  Experienced 
workers  earn  much  more  in  firms  operating  in  higher  variance  product  classes  (looking  at 
columns 3 and 4).  Higher returns to experience arise because workers who stay with their firm   30 
have strikingly high earnings growth in high variance product classes (looking at column 5).  The 
regressions in Table 5 showed that high variance firms do not reward job hopping, so we don’t 
present  simulated  wages  from  the  between  job  earnings  growth  regressions.  The  overall 
conclusion is that loyalty pays, and it pays the most for workers in firms in high variance product 
classes.   
We  use  the  phrase  “loyalty  pays”  to  counter  graphically  the  often  heard  phrase  “job 
hopping pays” to characterize software stars.
31  A typical perception of the software industry is 
that stars hop from firm to firm.  We find that the typical worker is loyal and is rewarded for that 
loyalty with higher earnings: in other words, the typical worker stays at least five years, and 
workers with greater tenure boast much higher potential earnings than workers who hop between 
jobs.  Moreover, the firms that reward such loyalty the most are the very firms that operate in 
high-risk (and thus high-payoff) product markets.  We cannot assess why loyalty pays—it could 
be  teamwork,  the  firm’s  protection  of  its  intellectual  property,  or  the  long  run  development 
duration of projects—but it does pay.  
We return finally to the raw data to lend support to our regression results that loyalty 
pays.  Figure 4 divides the source of wage growth for workers into wage growth achieved by 
moving between jobs (or “job-hopping”) versus wage growth achieved by staying with the same 
firm and experiencing pay increases (for the within firm pay).  For the approximately 4% of the 
sample who earn over $1 million in the last period in which we observe them, as we look back 
over their careers, over 95 percent of their wage growth arose within firms, and less than five 
percent from movement between firms.
32 By contrast, among software workers in the $50-75K 
range, the final pay is achieved by a combination of changing jobs and by wage growth when 





                                                 
31 See Fallick et al. (2005) for results focusing on geographic variation in job hopping among software workers. 
32 Our definition of between-firm wage growth is annualized starting compensation minus the ending compensation 
at the last firm. The starting compensation does not include options granted, so in some sense we could say that we 
are underestimating the gains to job-hopping if software workers are moving between firms to achieve higher option 
grants. Nevertheless, our key point is that options granted are not yet compensation – the individual must stay with 
the firm four years (typically) to vest the options granted and the options must be “in-the-money” as a result of 
performance.  Thus, even if options are granted with job change, the pay is only realized from within firm pay 
increases – the person must stay and perform.   




Thus, the striking result from Figure 4 is that even within the software industry, workers 
earn more from loyalty to their employer.  That is, by far the greatest wage gains come not from 
hopping between employers, but rather from staying with an employer and earning higher pay 
over time.  The figure corroborates our regression results: high wage growth arises for workers in 
high payoff product markets when they stay with their current employer—for these workers, the 
return to loyalty can be very high.  
The Variance of Pay Within Firms  
Given  that  high  product  variance  firms  pay  their  stars  very  well,  an  auxiliary  set  of 
questions  emerge  along  the  following  lines:  is  the  variance  of  earnings  greater  within  firms 
operating in high variance product classes?  Because we have earnings data on all individuals 
within all our firms, we are uniquely able to answer this question with the data.   
There is no clear-cut theoretical answer to the question.




jt = ￿0 + ￿1(￿
p




jt is the within firm variance in wages for firm j.  In our data (and all other data sets), 
the earnings variance rises within firms with workers’ tenure levels.  The question is whether the 
variance of wages is greater for firms in high variance payoff markets (a positive ￿1) than for 
firms in low variance payoff markets.  The answer depends on the nature of the production 
                                                 
34 For a model of the segregation of jobs into high-skill firms and low-skill firms and implications for wage 
inequality, see Kremer and Maskin (forthcoming).    32 
function within firms.  Do firms that have a high payoff, ￿
p
jt a) want to employ only stars within 
the firm, so all are high paying (i.e.,  ￿1<0 or ￿1=0), or do firms that a high payoff b) want to 
employ some stars than other firms have (i.e., ￿1>0)? The theoretical answer depends upon the 
complementarity  between  stars  and  non-stars.  In  addition,  if  a  substantial  part  of  the 
compensation is group-based pay (as in bonuses), then ￿1<0.    
Our data provide the answer. For the most part, earnings inequality is greater within firms 
operating in high variance product classes. In Table 7, we use the individual earnings data, but 
with  a  dependent  variable  that  is  each  worker’s  experienced  earnings  minus  the  median 
experienced earnings in his firm.
35 The product payoff dispersion has a very strong positive 
effect (￿1) on earnings inequality, and the effect grows with firm size.  The rising effect with firm 
size is not surprising; it is well known that executive pay rises with firm size, as CEO’s in larger 
firms control more capital.  What we show is that large firms operating in high payoff product 
markets have the highest within firm earnings inequality.   
Table 7: Regressions of Individual Wage Levels minus Firm-specific Median Wages 
  All Firms  Small Firms  Large Firms 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Product Payoff Dispersion+  0.3738  0.2912  0.1405  0.1495  0.8989  0.4256 
   (0.0385)**  (0.0388)**  (0.0440)**  (0.0430)**  (0.0731)**  (0.0972)** 
Log Revenue per Worker  0.1071  0.0357  -0.0042  0.0010  0.1187  0.0634 
   (0.0048)**  (0.0068)**  (0.0098)  (0.0103)  (0.0063)**  (0.0111)** 
Firm Average Worker Churn   -0.3363  -0.6089  0.3485  -0.2093  -1.0988  -1.3821 
   (0.1011)**  (0.1200)**  (0.1134)**  (0.1358)  (0.1811)**  (0.2729)** 
Controls++  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  26276  26276  7840  7840  18436  18436 
All dependent variables are wage residuals from regression controlling for age and tenure (see Appendix 2).   
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
+ Weighted 90/50 Ratio of Log Revenue per Worker in Firm' s Product Lines ++ Controls include (log) firm employment; (log) 
firm employment squared;  dummies for firm age (<6 years old, 6-10 years old, 11+ years old, with <6 omitted); 
firm employment growth rate; a dummy for whether the firm is in a high density, high education,   and industrially diversified 
county; and year and quarter job separation dummies. 
 
These results are largely replicated in Table 8, when the dependent variable is the 90/50 
ratio of the earnings within the firm.  The disadvantage of this approach is that the sample size 
decreases substantially when the unit of observation is the firm, for 688 firms, and thus we are 
losing the information on every person’s position in the earnings distribution.  The estimated ￿1 
is significantly positive for starting salaries.  For experienced earnings, the ￿1 is typically twice as 
                                                 
35 In Tables 7 and 8, we continue to restrict the sample to the same earnings ($50K+) and age categories in all of the 
prior analysis.  Thus, our findings on dispersion of earnings within the firm reflect the dispersion of earnings in the 
upper tail of the distribution of earnings (i.e.,  minimum earnings is $50K).   33 
large, but less precisely estimated.  We do not detect firm size differences in ￿1 in this smaller 
data set.  However, most notably, in the lower panel of Table 8, we show that when we take most 
stock options out of the data, the ￿1 remains positive. 
 
Table 8: Within-Firm Earnings Residual Dispersion Regressions 
  
Beginning of Spell 
Earnings              
"Starting Salaries"  






   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Product Payoff Dispersion +  0.3060  0.2985  0.7685  0.7178  0.5273  0.4582 
   (0.1084)** (0.0965)**  (0.5585)  (0.2705)**  (0.3133)  (0.1985)* 
Log Sales per Worker  0.0707  0.0206  0.6225  0.1183  0.3006  0.1069 
   (0.0235)**  (0.0287)  (0.1613)**  (0.0954)  (0.0725)** (0.0579) 
Firm Average Worker Churn   0.2521  0.6981  -1.5985  2.8754  0.9884  2.8380 
   (0.7097)  (0.4461)  (4.1871)  (1.7730)  (2.1438)  (1.2434)* 
Constant  -0.1704  -0.0426  -2.9961  -0.2612  -1.3989  -0.5440 
   (0.1842)  (0.1876)  (1.0964)**  (0.6083)  (0.5538)*  (0.3848) 
Controls++  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  688  688  688  688  688  688 
R-squared  0.26  0.36  0.67  0.89  0.59  0.76 
All dependent variables are wage residuals from regression controlling for age and tenure (see Appendix 2).   
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
+ Weighted 90/50 Ratio of Log Revenue per Worker in Firm' s Product Lines  ++ Controls include (log) firm employment; (log) 
firm employment squared; dummies for firm age (<6 years old, 6-10 years old, 11+ years old, with <6 omitted); firm 
employment growth rate; a dummy for whether the firm is in a high density, high education,  and industrially diversified county; 
and year and quarter job separation dummies. 
 
Finally, consider how these results fit into the picture portrayed by our earlier earnings 
regression  results.    The  earnings  regression  results  presented  in  Tables  4  and  5  provide  an 
explanation for the increasing variance of wages over time across firms in the economy and 
within sectors and occupations: the increasing movement of the economy towards knowledge 
workers has increased the value of stars to firms, and thus increased the variance of pay.  The 
variance of pay across all workers is rising due to the nature of the production function (the need 
for stars), and the sorting and rewarding of stars to high payoff firms.  The within-firm regression 
results of Tables 7 and 8 show that the variance of within-firm earnings is also a function of the 
variance of the product market payoffs that firms face.   
5.  Conclusion 
The process of innovation in the U.S. economy is fundamentally dependent on employing 
and  rewarding  highly  talented  workers  to  produce  new  products.    This  paper  makes  a  key 
connection between talent and firms in markets with risky product innovations – we show that   34 
software firms that operate in product markets with highly skewed returns to innovation, or high 
variance payoffs, are more likely to attract and pay for star workers.  Thus, firms in high variance 
product markets pay more up-front—in starting salaries—to attract and motivate star employees, 
because if these star workers produce home-run innovations, the firm’s winnings will be huge.  
These same firms also pay highly for loyalty: employees that stay with a firm have much higher 
earnings in firms with high variance product market payoffs.  These striking effects are robust to 
the inclusion of a wide range of controls for both workers and firm characteristics.  In addition, 
we show that in firms that have actually hit home runs, with high revenues, the rewards for star 
talent are even greater.   
There may be many factors underlying the finding that loyalty is rewarded more in firms 
operating in risky product markets.   In these  firms, workers  are likely to have firm-specific 
human capital, and also worker quality is identified and rewarded with performance bonuses 
slowly on the job.  However, much of their human capital is likely to be product-specific (such 
as a knowledge of wireless software), not firm specific.  Thus, firms tie workers to their firms 
through deferred compensation – they offer options that become vested only after the employee 
is with the firm four years.  And clearly the deferred compensation is performance pay – stock 
options pay off only if the firm performs.  However, our model emphasizes that firms pay high 
wages to employees just to be in the game – to play in the market where there are potential big 
winners – whether the firm actually wins or not.  
Though the focus of this paper is on the software industry, our results should generalize 
to  other  industries  that  utilize  knowledge  workers.    There  were  very  pragmatic  reasons  for 
focusing on the software industry: the ability to examine one production function as well as use a 
dataset that matches data on software workers to data on software firms. In addition, firms in the 
software  industry  have  several  attractive  features:  firms  are  innovative,  and  hence  have  the 
greatest payoff potential from star talent; the activities of knowledge workers can be directly tied 
to the performance of the firm; and workers perform the same tasks within and across firms, so 
we can describe and model the production function for these workers.  However, all industries 
that value project development that pays off should pay high wages to attract the most talented 
employees.   
Overall, our results, which document a link between income variance and innovation, 
complement results in the literature on rising income inequality, changing skill demand, and   35 
economic growth. The income inequality literature has shown that there has been an increasing 
return  to  skill  both  within  occupations  and  industries  as  well  as  across  occupations  and 
industries. Autor et al. (2005, 2006) and Lemieux (2006) show that rising income inequality 
reflects an increasing polarization of the job market, noting that income inequality in the upper 
tail of the income distribution has grown markedly: wages for workers at the 90
th percentile of 
the wage distribution have risen dramatically since 1980 relative to wages of workers at the 
median, at the same time that there has been no increase in the pay differential between workers 
at the median and the low wage end at the 10
th percentile of the wage distribution.   
The rising polarization of the wage distribution suggests that there has been an increase in 
the demand for highly skilled workers.  Those workers in occupations requiring high educational 
attainment,  and  in  particular  those  workers  in  occupations  that  would  be  classified  as 
“knowledge” occupations, have seen the greatest growth in demand (Autor et al. 2005, 2006; 
Autor  et  al.  2003).    Our  focus  on  software  therefore  provides  insights  into  the  wage 
determination  and  demand  patterns  of  an  industry  that  may  shed  light  into  wage  changes 
occurring in other industries or occupations. The findings are of particular interest since workers 
in the industry tend to have the same basic education levels and tend to work in firms with 
similar basic production functions.  Therefore, unlike previous studies, we are also able to look 
very closely at the product demand side of the firm and tie it to skill demand.  Our conclusion is 
that software firms with the highest potential return to innovation activities by skilled workers 
are the very firms that are increasing their demand for very highly talented workers and are 
paying these high talent workers much more.   The high pay that innovating firms offer top 
knowledge workers increases the variance of pay in software — both across firms and within 
firms.  But we interpret this increasing income inequality within software as a positive force. The 
firms paying for high talent among software workers are aiming to increase the skills and effort 
of software workers.  Finally, it is also likely to be a positive force for economic growth.  Our 
data show that firms operating in the most innovative software areas – those firms in product 
markets that have very high variance value-added payoffs – are those that demand and pay for 
top talent.  Firms such as these, which focus on innovations, have certainly been a source of 
growth in the U.S. economy in recent years (as in the computer industry), and are likely to be 
among the biggest drivers of growth in the future.   
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The Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Program database links state 
level data on Unemployment Insurance earnings of all employees within firms to employer data 
from Census surveys (Abowd et al. 2004).
36  Since the scope of the LEHD data is virtually the 
full universe of employers and workers, movements of workers through the earnings distribution 
as well as across employers can be tracked accurately.
37 Because these data are administrative in 
nature, both the employment and earnings measures are different from those usually found in 
surveys. The information in each wage record is simply the total earnings for each individual in a 
given quarter with a given employer; there is no information on hours or weeks worked, or 
indeed the duration of employment within the quarter. One key advantage of this administrative 
data  is  that  the  earnings  measures  are  quarterly  and  include  bonuses  and  exercised  stock 
options.
38   
  For the analysis of compensation over workers’ careers, we use a subset of ten states for 
which  we  have  data  for  a  sufficiently  large  number  of  years  that  we  can  construct  worker 
earnings histories from which to make meaningful inferences. We also limit our data to workers 
between the ages 21 and 44, which permits us to focus on the demand for workers in the prime of 
their  careers.  We  use  earnings  for  individuals  who  where  full-quarter  employed  in  the  final 
quarter of 1997 and whose dominant employer (i.e., the employer at which the worker earned the 
most in a given quarter) was in the software industry.
39  We focus on software-industry spells 
that span 1997 because software firms in existence that year are most readily matched to the 
1997 Economic Census, which contains extensive information about businesses in the industry.  
We then construct complete employment and earnings histories for individuals in these firms, 
building backwards from their 1997 software spell and examining prior jobs, including those 
within the software industry and those in other industries. These distributions helped to inform 
our decision to set the $50,000 (in $2001) threshold for our primary sample of workers. 
Using firm identifiers on the UI data, we match LEHD data to the Economic Census.  
The Economic Census of the services industry is conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau in years 
ending in “2” and “7.”  We use the 1997 Economic Census because it characterizes the products 
                                                 
36 As of mid-2006, the LEHD had 40 partner states. This is an ongoing project and additional states are expected to 
join this program. Because of the sensitivity of these data it is worth noting that the data are anonymized before they 
are used in any Census Bureau projects; all standard identifiers and names are stripped and replaced by a unique 
“Protected Identification Key.”  Only Census Bureau employees or individuals who have Special Sworn Status are 
permitted to  work  with the  data, and there are serious penalties for disclosing the identity of an individual or 
business.  Any research must be for statistical purposes only, and must be reviewed by the Census Bureau and other 
data custodians. Under Title 13 of the U.S. code, any breach of confidentiality can result in prosecution in which 
violators are subject to a $250,000 fine and/or 5 years in jail.  
37 Stevens (2002) describes coverage issues related to the LEHD database. 
38 For the laws surrounding the reporting of options, see the example from the California Employment Development 
Department at http://www.edd.ca.gov/taxrep/de231sk.pdf.  For analysis of options granted and data available on 
option values, see Oyer and Schaeffer (2004).     
39 Due to the inability to capture hours or weeks in the data, we use a full quarter (FQ) earnings measure. This 
measure represents earnings for workers who have been employed by the same employer for a full quarter; that is, it 
represents earnings for a worker who is observed at a firm in quarter t, t-1 and t+1.  While this does not rule out part-
time work, it does rule out obviously truncated quarters.     40 
produced by firms in the software industry at a level of detail greater than in any prior year. 
Unfortunately, products cannot be matched across Census years. 
    There  were  83,497  job  spells  in  software  publishing  that  were  ongoing  in  the  fourth 
quarter of 1997 in the ten states in our sample.
40 When we condition on workers aged 21-44, the 
number of spells in the sample falls to 67,452. Finally, because we do not have occupational data 
in the full LEHD data set but would like to exclude administrative staff and other ancillary 
workers in the industry, we decide to limit our analysis to only spells that had annualized end-of-
spell earnings greater than or equal to $50,000 (in $2001). This restriction, which limits the 
sample to 51,859 spells, is aimed at isolating computer programmers, developers, and managers 
while weeding out lower administrative and support staff. The $50,000 threshold was set in light 
the results of two separate, but related exercises. We first turned to the 5% Public-Use Microdata 
Sample (PUMS) from the 2000 Decennial Census to get a sense of the distribution of earnings 
within  the  relevant  set  of  software  occupations  (programmers,  developers,  engineers,  and 
managers in the software industry).
41 
42 We also matched our sample of workers with the Long-
Form of the 2000 Decennial Census, which provided us with occupation information for slightly 
less than one-sixth of our sample. We then evaluated the earnings of those workers for whom we 
obtained occupational information.  These exercises suggest that the $50K threshold is quite 
reasonable for focusing on software developers, engineers, and managers.  We also note that for 
the  core  specifications  we  consider  in  the  empirical  analysis,  we  have  estimated  the 
specifications using the restricted matched sample where we directly observe occupation.  In 
unreported results, we show that the main implications of the analysis are robust to the use of this 
restricted sample. 
  While  most  businesses  in  our  $50,000+  sample  of  workers  aged  21-44  could  be 
successfully  matched  to  the  Economic  Census,  a  smaller  subset  had  complete  information, 
including size, age, revenue, and detailed product line information. There are 26,276 spells for 
which  we  have  complete  information  regarding  worker  characteristics  as  well  as  firm 




The  firm-specific  potential  payoff  measure  is  computed  as  follows.  Beginning  with 
establishment-level Economic Census data, we distribute each establishment' s total sales revenue 
across its product lines according to the reported percentages. We then aggregate to the EIN-
product line level, summing sales across establishments within this EIN-product line. Next, we 
aggregate  to  the  EIN  level  since  this  is  the  common  firm  identifier  in  both  the  Economic 
Censuses and in the LEHD data.  Total sales are summed by EIN, excluding the “other” product 
line categories. New percentages are then calculated (adjusted so they do not include "other" 
categories) at the EIN-product line level, and the payoff measure, which we calculate as the 
natural  log  of  sales  per  worker,  is  distributed  across  all  product  lines  within  an  EIN  (after 
                                                 
40 Counting the 1997 software spells and all the previous spells held by workers in these software jobs, we have 
143,485 spells in the data. 
41 The primary occupations on which we focused included Census industry occupation codes 100 (Computer and 
Information  Scientists,  Research),  101  (Computer  Programmers),  and  102  (Computer  Software  Engineers, 
Applications and Systems Software), as well as 001-043 (managerial occupations). 
42 We also use information from the Decennial to obtain information regarding basic characteristics of the counties 
in which people in the sample are employed, including population and employment densities, as well as average 
educational and income levels. These enter the control variables in the regressions.   41 
adjusting EIN total employment downward by the same percentage that total employer sales 
were adjusted downward due to the exclusion of the "other" categories). This number is the same 
across all product lines within an employer (we thus assume that profitability is the same across 
all product lines within an employer). Then, treating each EIN-product line combination as if it 
were its own establishment, we obtain the difference between 90th percentile and 50th percentile 
of log sales per worker by product line. Finally, these 90-50 ratios are merged back onto the 
EIN-product  line  file,  and  the  weighted  average  of  the  90-50  ratios  associated  with  all  the 
product lines within an employer is what is used as our measure of potential payoffs.   
By using the 90/50 ratio, we focus on the upper tail of the payoff distribution.  It is highly 
correlated with other measures of skewness.  However, note that we do not have data on the 
lower tail of the distribution – we only observe positive revenue for the firms, not negative 
revenue – so we focus on the returns to high payoffs.   42 
Appendix 2: Calculation of Residuals 
 
Using the worker-spells data, we wish to characterize what it means to be a star worker – 
a worker whose wage level and/or wage growth rate is abnormally high.  We do so by deriving 
residuals from regressions of earnings levels and growth rates; the purpose of using residuals is 
to find those individuals who have abnormally high earnings levels and/or earnings growth after 
controlling for their age and experience. 
We  begin  by  computing  earnings  level  residuals  for  individuals  in  the  sample.  We 
compute the end-of-software-spell earnings level residual for each spell in the sample as the 
residual from a regression of log end-of-spell earnings on quadratics of tenure at job, tenure in 
industry, and age, fully interacted with each other and with appropriate left and right censoring 
dummies. In a similar fashion, we compute beginning-of-software-spell earnings level residuals 
and lagged end-of-software-spell earnings level residuals. 
We then compute within job earnings growth residuals and between job earnings growth 
residuals for individuals in the sample. The former is the residual from a regression of within job 
earnings  growth  for  each  spell  in  the  sample  on  quadratics  of  tenure  at  job  and  age,  fully 
interacted with each other and with appropriate left and right censoring dummies. The latter is 
the residual from a regression of between job earnings growth for each transition on tenure at 
(previous)  job  and  age,  fully  interacted  with  each  other  and  with  appropriate  left  and  right 
censoring  dummies  as  well  as  dummies  for  a  switch  within  industry  and  a  switch  between 
industries. We then form an earnings growth residual for each individual that is simply the sum 
of within job and between job residuals over their work histories.  
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Table A1: Log End-of-Spell Annualized Earnings 
Dependent Variable: Log End-of-Spell Annualized Earnings 
Observations  143,485       
Parameter  Estimate Standard Error  t Value  Pr>|t| 
           
Intercept  6.4046  0.0347  184.4000  <.0001 
Tenure in Industry   0.0545  0.0039  14.1300  <.0001 
Tenure in Industry Squared  -0.0010  0.0001  -12.0500  <.0001 
Tenure in Job  0.0992  0.0040  25.0300  <.0001 
Tenure in Job Squared  -0.0003  0.0001  -3.8800  0.0001 
Age   0.1694  0.0017  97.5500  <.0001 
Age Squared  -0.0016  0.0000  -75.0000  <.0001 
Right Censored Spell  0.8766  0.0687  12.7600  <.0001 
Left Censored Spell  -0.1425  0.0133  -10.7300  <.0001 
Tenure in Industry x Left Censored Industry Spell  -0.0144  0.0039  -3.6800  0.0002 
Tenure in Industry Squared x Left Censored Industry Spell  0.0002  0.0001  3.0300  0.0025 
Tenure in Job x Left Censored Job Spell  -0.0187  0.0044  -4.2200  <.0001 
Tenure in Job Squared x Left Censored Job Spell  0.0003  0.0001  3.1900  0.0014 
Tenure in Industry x Right Censored Industry Spell  -0.0269  0.0219  -1.2200  0.2207 
Tenure in Industry Squared x Right Censored Industry Spell  0.0003  0.0003  0.9000  0.3691 
Tenure in Job x Right Censored Job Spell  -0.0418  0.0219  -1.9100  0.0564 
Tenure in Job Squared x Right Censored Job Spell  0.0011  0.0003  3.2000  0.0014 
Tenure in Industry x Age  -0.0004  0.0001  -4.1300  <.0001 
Tenure in Job x Age  -0.0016  0.0001  -17.6900  <.0001 
Tenure in Industry x Age x Left Censored Industry Spell  0.0004  0.0001  4.4600  <.0001 
Tenure in Job x Age x Left Censored Job Spell  0.0002  0.0001  2.1300  0.0336 
Tenure in Industry x Age x Right Censored Industry Spell  0.0001  0.0003  0.3600  0.7208 
Tenure in Job x Age x Right Censored Job Spell  -0.0003  0.0003  -0.8600  0.3913 
Separated Q1  0.0378  0.0072  5.2900  <.0001 
Separated Q3  0.0595  0.0070  8.4700  <.0001 
Separated Q4  0.0436  0.0074  5.8700  <.0001 
     Sum of      
Source  DF  Squares  Mean Square  F Value 
Model  25  43,074.80  1,722.99  2,309.20 
Error  143,459  107,040.92  0.7461    
Corrected Total  143,484  150,115.72      
           
R-Square  Coeff Var  Root MSE  LHS Variable Mean    
0.286944  7.844303  0.863796  11.01176    
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Table A2: Log Beginning-of-Spell Annualized Earnings 
Dependent Variable: Log Beginning-of-Spell Annualized Earnings 
Observations  143,485        
Parameter  Estimate  Standard Error  t Value  Pr>|t| 
           
Intercept  6.8097  0.0257  265.3500  <.0001 
Age   0.1829  0.0013  138.2700  <.0001 
Age Squared  -0.0019  0.0000  -117.1200  <.0001 
Left Censored Spell  -0.1313  0.0052  -25.0700  <.0001 
Accessed Q1  -0.0862  0.0057  -15.1600  <.0001 
Accessed Q3  0.0134  0.0054  2.4900  0.0128 
Accessed Q4  -0.0296  0.0058  -5.0800  <.0001 
     Sum of      
Source  DF  Squares  Mean Square  F Value 
Model  6  16,191.69  2,698.62  5,946.98 
Error  143,478  65,107.30  0.45    
Corrected Total  143,484  81,298.99      
           
R-Square  Coeff Var  Root MSE  LHS Variable Mean    
0.199162  6.300298  0.673631  10.69205    
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Table A3: Lagged Log End-of-Spell Annualized Earnings 
Dependent Variable: Lagged Log End-of-Spell Annualized Earnings 
Observations  143,485       
Parameter  Estimate Standard Error  t Value  Pr>|t| 
           
Intercept  6.4128  0.0328  195.5500  <.0001 
Tenure (Adjusted) in Industry   0.0313  0.0041  7.7200  <.0001 
Tenure (Adjusted) in Industry Squared  -0.0005  0.0001  -4.7700  <.0001 
Tenure (Adjusted) in Job  0.1602  0.0042  38.2400  <.0001 
Tenure (Adjusted) in Job Squared  -0.0023  0.0001  -23.6400  <.0001 
Age   0.1683  0.0017  99.9600  <.0001 
Age Squared  -0.0017  0.0000  -77.8300  <.0001 
Right Censored Spell  0.5539  0.0363  15.2400  <.0001 
Left Censored Spell  0.0352  0.0085  4.1500  <.0001 
Tenure (Adjusted) in Industry x Left Censored Industry Spell  0.0006  0.0045  0.1300  0.8958 
Tenure (Adjusted) in Industry Squared x Left Censored Industry Spell  -0.0003  0.0001  -2.4100  0.0161 
Tenure (Adjusted) in Job x Left Censored Job Spell  -0.0777  0.0048  -16.0300  <.0001 
Tenure (Adjusted) in Job Squared x Left Censored Job Spell  0.0019  0.0001  17.0800  <.0001 
Tenure (Adjusted) in Industry x Right Censored Industry Spell  -0.0367  0.0196  -1.8800  0.0606 
Tenure (Adjusted) in Industry Squared x Right Censored Industry Spell  0.0009  0.0003  2.6300  0.0085 
Tenure (Adjusted) in Job x Right Censored Job Spell  -0.0271  0.0197  -1.3800  0.1689 
Tenure (Adjusted) in Job Squared x Right Censored Job Spell  0.0007  0.0003  2.1500  0.0314 
Tenure (Adjusted) in Industry x Age  -0.0003  0.0001  -2.9200  0.0035 
Tenure (Adjusted) in Job x Age  -0.0017  0.0001  -18.0700  <.0001 
Tenure (Adjusted) in Industry x Age x Left Censored Industry Spell  0.0004  0.0001  3.8300  0.0001 
Tenure (Adjusted) in Job x Age x Left Censored Job Spell  0.0005  0.0001  4.4300  <.0001 
Tenure (Adjusted) in Industry x Age x Right Censored Industry Spell  -0.0003  0.0003  -1.0500  0.2947 
Tenure (Adjusted) in Job x Age x Right Censored Job Spell  0.0003  0.0003  0.8100  0.4184 
Quarter 1 Dummy  -0.0231  0.0070  -3.3100  0.0009 
Quarter 2 Dummy  0.1038  0.0068  15.1600  <.0001 
Quarter 4 Dummy  0.1318  0.0072  18.2100  <.0001 
     Sum of      
Source  DF  Squares  Mean Square  F Value 
Model  25  53929.872  2157.1949  3041.4 
Error  143459  101752.14  0.7093    
Corrected Total  143484  155682.01      
           
R-Square  Coeff Var  Root MSE  LHS Variable Mean   
           
0.34641  7.752834  0.842186  10.86294    
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Table A4: Annualized Within-Job Earnings Growth 
Dependent Variable: Annualized Within-Job Earnings Growth 
Observations  143,485       
Parameter  Estimate  Standard Error  t Value  Pr>|t| 
           
Intercept  0.0877  0.0122  7.2200  <.0001 
Tenure in Job  0.0143  0.0006  23.6300  <.0001 
Tenure in Job Squared  -0.0002  0.0000  -12.6600  <.0001 
Age   -0.0037  0.0006  -6.2100  <.0001 
Age Squared  0.0000  0.0000  4.1400  <.0001 
Right Censored Spell  0.3153  0.0234  13.4600  <.0001 
Left Censored Spell  0.0097  0.0048  2.0100  0.0449 
Tenure in Job x Left Censored Job Spell  -0.0039  0.0008  -4.7900  <.0001 
Tenure in Job Squared x Left Censored Job Spell  0.0001  0.0000  4.5900  <.0001 
Tenure in Job x Right Censored Job Spell  -0.0283  0.0019  -14.7000  <.0001 
Tenure in Job Squared x Right Censored Job Spell  0.0005  0.0000  14.3900  <.0001 
Tenure in Job x Age  -0.0001  0.0000  -9.1400  <.0001 
Tenure in Job x Age x Left Censored Job Spell  0.0000  0.0000  0.4800  0.6339 
Tenure in Job x Age x Right Censored Job Spell  0.0000  0.0000  0.9100  0.3627 
Separated Q1  -0.0021  0.0025  -0.8300  0.4091 
Separated Q3  0.0242  0.0025  9.8400  <.0001 
Separated Q4  0.0263  0.0026  10.1200  <.0001 
Accessed Q1  0.0153  0.0026  5.9800  <.0001 
Accessed Q3  -0.0049  0.0024  -2.0200  0.0433 
Accessed Q4  -0.0200  0.0026  -7.6000  <.0001 
     Sum of       
Source  DF  Squares  Mean Square  F Value 
Model  19  310.60719  16.34775  179.97 
Error  143,465  13,031.52  0.09083    
Corrected Total  143,484  13,342.13      
           
R-Square  Coeff Var  Root MSE  LHS Variable Mean    
0.02328  399.5266  0.301387  0.075436    
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Table A5: Annualized Between-Job Earnings Growth 
Dependent Variable: Annualized Between-Job Earnings Growth 
Observations  59,538       
Parameter  Estimate Standard Error  t Value  Pr>|t| 
           
Intercept  1.6536  0.0382  43.3100  <.0001 
Age   -0.0588  0.0019  -30.4600  <.0001 
Age Squared  0.0006  0.0000  23.6500  <.0001 
Tenure in Previous Job  -0.0491  0.0045  -10.8900  <.0001 
Tenure in Previous Job Squared  0.0016  0.0002  7.2700  <.0001 
Left Censored Tenure in Previous Job  -0.1683  0.0130  -12.9400  <.0001 
Tenure in Previous Job x Left Censored Previous Job Spell  0.0482  0.0054  8.9400  <.0001 
Tenure in Previous Job Squared x Left Censored Previous Job Spell  -0.0012  0.0003  -4.2500  <.0001 
Age x Tenure in Previous Job   0.0005  0.0001  4.8000  <.0001 
Age x Tenure in Previous Job x Left Censored Previous Job Spell  -0.0007  0.0001  -7.1100  <.0001 
Switch Within Industries  -0.1002  0.0068  -14.8200  <.0001 
Switch Between Industries  (omitted)  .  .  . 
Separated Q1  -0.0132  0.0073  -1.8000  0.0716 
Separated Q3  -0.0038  0.0063  -0.6100  0.5427 
Separated Q4  -0.0253  0.0078  -3.2400  0.0012 
Accessed Q1  0.0051  0.0066  0.7700  0.4411 
Accessed Q3  -0.0049  0.0064  -0.7600  0.4463 
Accessed Q4  0.0712  0.0071  10.1000  <.0001 
     Sum of       
Source  DF  Squares  Mean Square  F Value 
Model  16  1,581.45  98.84088  293.17 
Error  59,521  20,066.95  0.33714    
Corrected Total  59,537  21,648.40      
           
R-Square  Coeff Var  Root MSE  LHS Variable Mean    
0.073052  294.0657  0.580638  0.197452    
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Appendix 3: Supplementary Analysis of Wage Growth  
 
  As Figure 5 in Section 5 suggests, individuals with relatively high earnings levels who 
were in the midst of software spells in 1997 experienced much of their earnings growth through 
within-job earnings growth over the course of their entire employment histories including the 
software spell and prior spells. However, one might be suspicious of these results given that 
some spells may be censored and that those who are not observed to transition between jobs 
necessarily have shares attributable to within-job earnings growth equal to one. Yet, as Figure 
A1 reveals, even for those who are observed to transition at least once, the share of growth 




The  following  two  figures  reinforce  this  message.  They  depict  the  share  of  earnings 
growth attributable to within-job earnings growth and between-job earnings growth by number 
of spells. While the share of earnings growth attributable to within-job earnings growth falls with 
the number of job transitions observed, those with the highest end-of-spell earnings tend to be 
individuals observed in relatively few spells. 
 
Figure A2 
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Figure A3 
 
 
 
 
 